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International Climate Policy and Regional Welfare Weights 
 
1. Introduction 
Climate policy is a moral issue. If one does not care about the remote future, about faraway 
lands, or small risks with large consequences, then one does not care about climate change. 
Any statement about the desirability of certain cuts in greenhouse gas emissions is therewith 
an ethical judgment. Decisions about abatement targets reflect the costs of emission reduction 
and the dangers of climate change, but also the relative value placed on the costs posed on 
some people and dangers relieved from others. In this paper, we investigate the welfare 
functions that are implicit in stated emissions targets. 
We approach this as follows. Assuming a global welfare function, we derive an equation for 
optimal greenhouse gas emission reduction per region. We populate this equation with 
emission scenarios, abatement cost estimates, estimates of the avoided impact of climate 
change, and assumptions about inequality aversion and time preference. We then assume that 
the stated emission reduction target is optimal, and solve the equation for the welfare weights 
in the welfare function. It is obvious that there are a large number of assumptions, so we 
conduct extensive sensitivity analyses. 
Note that we assume that differences in marginal welfare in different regions are the reason 
for differentiation of the carbon tax. A global, uniform tax or a tradable permit scheme 
leading to a uniform global carbon price (Nordhaus, 2008) is the optimal policy instrument in 
a world where the economy works efficiently except for the carbon externality. It may not be 
the best solution when implemented in a second-best world. A factor that is important in this 
context is the limited feasibility of international income redistributions after a harmonized 
carbon price is applied (Laffont, 1988). Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) and Anthoff (2009) 
point out the significance of income allocation for efficiency of policy, arguing that a global 
uniform carbon tax is efficient only when lump-sum transfer of income is feasible. In practice, 
such perfect global transfer is difficult to be achieved for at least two reasons. The first is the 
sheer scale of economic gaps – income levels differ up to one hundred fold across countries, 
and any attempt to significantly alter the distributions would involve a considerable financial 
flow accompanying various distortions. The other is the absence of effective global 
institutions to manage redistributions – the effectiveness of foreign aid even at the current 
level, which is far less than 1% of income for developed nations, is questioned by some of the 
most serious observers in the field (Easterly, 2006; Collier, 2007).  
As evidenced by the target allocations under the Kyoto Protocol,4 most policymakers share 
the view that high- and low-income countries should carry different responsibilities with 
regard to reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In other words, developed countries should 
bear high reduction costs relative to developing countries. This means that the negotiators 
implicitly assumed some country-specific marginal welfare to justify different carbon prices 
for different countries, resulting in their varied policy proposals. Eyckmans et al. (1993) 
estimated the revealed welfare weights for a hypothetical climate policy agreement, by 
reformulating and reinterpreting the weights as relative distribution of power leading to the 
agreement.5 This paper applies the framework of Eyckmans et al. and performs a positive 
analysis of actual climate policy agreements and proposals, namely the retrospective Kyoto 
case and two proposals for a post-Kyoto agreement. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our methodological approach, 
which is framed in the spirit of Eyckmans et al.’s (1993) with small modifications to fit our 
scope. Section 3 shows our results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Method 
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We consider a simple static model of greenhouse gas reduction in the spirit of Eyckmans et al. 
(1993). Here, n regions with different income levels reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 
Emission reduction policy is chosen for each region. As greenhouse gas concentrations are 
uniform across all regions, the benefit of reduction for each region is a function of the global 
total amount of emission reduction, whereas the cost is incurred only by respective regions 
where emission reduction takes place. Let the costs of emission reduction be given by Ci(Ri), 
where Ri is the (absolute amount of) emission reduction for region . The 
emission reduction Ri is also expressed as riEi, where ri and Ei are the proportional emission 
reduction and uncontrolled emissions, respectively.   
{ nNi ,...,1=∈
 
4 The Kyoto Protocol makes it clear that the signatories are subject to “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (Article 10). 
5 Lange and Vogt (2003) address a similar question by framing the issue differently. They examine the 
possibility of cooperation in international environmental negotiations when parties have some preference for 
equity of all members.  
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Eyckmans et al. draw on empirical evidence about a relationship between the marginal 
abatement cost (MC) and fractional emission reduction (r): ( rMC −− 1ln~ . Adopting the 
above relationship, C(Ri) is expressed as: 
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where αi is the unit cost parameter. 
Let the benefits of emission reduction Bi be a function of emission reduction R=(R1,…,Rn) of 
all regions: 
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where βi is the unit benefit parameter. 
We will analysis various potential global climate treaties, by assumption regions cooperate on 
emission reductions for those. Cooperative emission reduction follows from 
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Equation (4) is applicable if costs and benefits are evaluated on a monetary basis, in other 
words, differences in marginal utility across regions are ignored. A more general form of 
solutions can be obtained by taking account of a social welfare function. Let Pi denote the 
population size of region i. We consider a utilitarian social welfare function with some region-
specific welfare weight ωi. With a uniform per-capita income yi within each region i, the 
social welfare function W is expressed as: 
(5)  ( )i i i
i
W PUω=∑ y
where U(yi) is the utility function for the population of region i: U(y) = y1-η/(1-η) (η≠1) or lny 
(η=1). 
Once a climate policy is in place, the costs and benefits of reduction are added to income: 
(6) ( ) ( )i i i ii
i
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where iY  is the baseline output without climate policy for region i. 
Cooperative emission reduction is deduced from the maximization of social welfare (5). 
 
 
 The first-order conditions are: 
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Based on the formulation (8), we conduct a positive analysis for revealed welfare weights ω. 
With levels of other parameters given, we estimate the levels of revealed welfare weights that 
respective policies or policy proposals imply.  
To this end, we calibrate the parameters α and β with the integrated assessment model 
FUND,6 which is described and applied by Tol (2002a, b). Table 1 shows the estimated 
figures we use in the analysis. FUND is a global model composed of 16 regions (this study 
uses the same regional categorization. See Appendix for a detailed list of countries) and has 
components calculating economic values of both mitigation costs and damage from climate 
change. FUND’s output levels are set to be consistent with the IMAGE 100-year database 
(Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994), observational data compiled by the World Resources Institute 
(World Resources Institute, 2000), and socio-economic projections of the EMF14 
Standardized Scenario.  
As our analysis is static, we make the following additional assumptions in using data from the 
dynamic model FUND. Abatement costs are taken from a long-run relationship between 
mitigation costs and emission reduction (time-discounted average for the period 2010-2030).7 
For simplicity and clarity, we only focus on carbon dioxide as greenhouse gas. We consider 
two cases for abatement costs: regionally-heterogeneous marginal costs and globally uniform 
marginal costs (i.e., a perfect international emission trading is feasible). Unlike abatement 
costs, benefits of reduction are brought about over a long time horizon. Thus, the marginal 
benefits of reduction correspond to the time-discounted sum of marginal benefits for all years 
(whose absolute value equals the marginal social cost of carbon). We choose a 1%/year pure 
time preference rate (prtp) for our base case and examine alternative cases with 0%/year and 
3%/year.8 
                                                 
6 Detailed information about the model can be found at http://www.fund-model.org. 
7 Data from FUND fit well in regression with Equation (1), showing R2>0.98 for all regions. 
 5
8 While a number of important studies have been issued after the release of the Stern Review (2006), there is no 
consensus about the right level of the pure time preference rate yet.  
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3. Results 
 
Here we show our estimated regional welfare weights. We examine three policy examples. 
The first is the Kyoto Protocol (Case A), the second is the EU’s post-Kyoto policy proposal 
(Case B). Finally, we consider a recent proposal by Frankel (2009), which specifies 
quantitative targets globally over a long time horizon (Case C).9 
Table 2 summarizes the levels of emission reduction prescribed by each set of policy for 
individual regions. The Kyoto Protocol is effective from 2008 to 2012, whereas we evaluate 
post-Kyoto policies at the year 2020. The reference year of GDP per capita data, which are 
used for estimating the marginal utility, is thus 2010 (mid-year) for Case A and 2020 for 
Cases B and C. GDP per capita (based on GDP and population data) and emission data are 
taken from FUND’s base (business-as-usual) run. For sensitivity analysis, we raise and lower 
the baseline for GDP and emissions by 10%. 
Table 3 shows that, in the Kyoto case, marginal welfare (which is the welfare weight of each 
region times marginal utility of the region, i.e. ω/yη) is lower in OECD economies than that in 
Western Europe (WEU) except for Australia and New Zealand’s (ANZ). This means that the 
Kyoto Protocol favored Western Europe and Australasia over the rest of the OECD10, in the 
sense that these two regions gained the most in monetary terms. However, if we consider the 
pure welfare weight ω, the USA appears as the most favored region. Phrased differently, if 
η=1, the distribution of emission abatement between the US and EU (West)11 in the Kyoto 
Protocol is commensurate with their relative incomes; while the rest of the OECD was asked 
to take on a disproportionate burden. If η=2, the Kyoto Protocol placed a disproportionate 
burden on the wellbeing of all OECD regions compared to the USA. If income differences 
within the OECD do not play a role, then the Kyoto Protocol was very much an 
EU/Australasia treaty. If income differences do play a role, then the Kyoto Protocol was a US 
treaty. As the US was the first to abandon Kyoto, we tentatively conclude that income 
difference did not play a role within the OECD. 
 
9 Frankel proposes a formula to calculate countries’ emission target, which consists of three factors, namely, the 
Progressive Reductions Factor (PRF), the Latecomer Catch-up Factor (LCF), the Gradual Equalization Factor 
(GEF). He assumes that the first factor primarily plays a role in the short term, and that the second and third 
factors gradually come as a factor in later periods. In our case (dealing with rather a short time horizon), only the 
PRF is considered – it makes the targets overall less stringent than EU proposal’s. 
10 excluding the Eastern European members, Mexico and Turkey: henceforth, we refer to “OECD” as the set of 
regions excluding those members 
11 Henceforth, we refer to “EU (West)” as EU’s Western European members (the members before 2004). Note 
that most countries in WEU (Western Europe) belong to the EU, and also that the Western members produce a 
dominant proportion of economic output in the EU and also perhaps possess dominant influence on EU’s 
decision-making.  
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The EU is the self-proclaimed world leader on international climate policy. Table 3 reveals 
that, in monetary terms, the Kyoto Protocol strongly favors the EU (West) – and indeed, the 
EU is the only region that still takes the Kyoto Protocol seriously. The post-Kyoto policy 
proposed by the EU favors the other regions – except for Japan and South Korea. This is also 
true if we consider the cases with η>0. One interpretation is that the EU so dearly wants a 
global agreement that it discounts its own wellbeing. 
The Frankel proposal is radically different. It rewards the EU (West) for its past efforts, and 
puts punitive targets on the rest of the OECD. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are treated 
differently. The Kyoto Protocol handed them a generous deal in monetary terms, but this 
rapidly vanishes if corrected for income differences. The EU proposal for a post-Kyoto 
agreement is more generous to these countries. The former Soviet Union is treated more 
favorably than is Central and Eastern Europe. Frankel does not have targets for these 
countries. 
The EU proposal for a post-Kyoto agreement also has targets for developing countries (with 
an exception for the least developed ones). When evaluated from a monetary perspective 
(η=0), the proposed targets appear to be very generous: The EU places between 4.5 and 47 
times more weight on the welfare of poor people than on the welfare of its own residents. 
However, for η>0, this vanishes. While for η=2, the pure welfare weight ω tends to be greater 
than unity; for η=2, ω<1. Figure 1 shows that the weights are indeed strongly sensitive to the 
elasticity of marginal utility (inequity aversion) in lower income regions such as China and 
South Asia. 
Table 3 and Figure 1 suggest that the EU put either too much or too little weight on 
developing countries, depending on the value of η. In order to narrow down the conclusion, 
we follow Anthoff et al. (2009), who use data of Evans and Sezer (2004, 2005) to estimate a 
Normal probability distribution of η with a mean of 1.49 and a standard deviation of 0.19. We 
use this to construct a probability density function of ω. Figure 2 shows the probability 
distributions of welfare weight for three selected regions (USA, China and South Asia). As 
shown in Table 3, E(ωi) are generally lower than 1 in low-income regions. This result hints at 
the EU proposal’s relative toughness on developing regions. As before, the OECD regions 
and the former Soviet Union are treated disproportionally well by the EU proposal. 
 
An alternative interpretation of the revealed marginal welfare values is that the equity-
weighted marginal benefit of reduction ( ( )∑
j
jjj y βω η/ ) signifies the revealed marginal 
benefit of reduction for Western Europe, for which the weights are normalized. In case of the 
EU post-Kyoto proposal with prtp=1%/yr, ( )∑
j
jjj y βω η/  is $546 per ton (excluding sub-
Saharan Africa, where emission reduction is zero, meaning the weight is positive infinity),12 
whereas the non-weighted social cost of carbon (∑
j
jβ ) is $32 per ton. In other words, in its 
own proposal, Western Europe magnifies in perception the benefit of climate mitigation by a 
factor of 17. 
  
One can draw another insight. If one assumes that ωi=1 for all regions, one can estimate the 
region-specific ηi with the regions’ relative income to Western Europe’s (the column “η if ωi= 
ω” in Table 3). The estimates are below 2 for most regions, and some regions even show 
values below 1 (South America and South Asia). USA’s light reduction burden and high 
income is translated into a negative inequity aversion. 
While we interpret the different emission reduction targets as revealing negotiation power, it 
may of course also be that policy makers use different abatement costs than we do. Table 3 
shows what happens if we assume that emission reduction costs are uniform across the world. 
To some approximation, this may be the result of vigorous international trade in emission 
allowances. Under these assumptions, the pure welfare weight of the EU (West) is always 
greater than that of any other region. The Kyoto Protocol served the EU best, as does the 
Frankel proposal and indeed the EU proposal for a post-Kyoto agreement. 
Figure 3 shows the result of sensitivity analysis for Case B (the EU proposal case at 2020). It 
shows that while the absolute levels of weights differ significantly across cases, relative 
patterns across regions are well preserved with a given set of policy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 8
12 It should be stressed that this number is evaluated from Western Europe’s standpoint, as the weights are 
normalized as WEU=1. In other words, this number is meaningful only for Western Europe. For some other 
regions where weights are high, the perceived marginal benefit could be in fact much lower than the non-
weighted social cost of carbon of $32 per ton. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
Many policymakers regard equity as an integral element of international climate change 
policy, and some economists have discussed climate policy from a normative standpoint (e.g., 
Stern, 2006). This study clarifies how international climate policy takes into account income 
inequality in target-setting of emission reduction. We took an approach similar to Eyckmans 
et al. (1993) and estimated the welfare weights of different world regions that are implied by 
policy agreement and proposals. 
The following results emerge. The Kyoto Protocol favored the EU (as it was then). The 
Frankel proposal on burden sharing for a future treaty rewards the EU for taking the lead on 
climate change, while the EU proposal is very generous to other rich countries. Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union did well under the Kyoto Protocol and would do well 
under the EU proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty if evaluated in monetary terms. If income 
differences are considered, these regions come out less well. The same is true for less 
developed countries. While the EU proposal for a post-Kyoto treaty appears generous in 
monetary terms, it is not at all in utility terms. In sum, (proposals for) burden sharing in 
international climate treaties do not display a concern for international equity; self-serving 
behavior is a more likely explanation. 
This research should be extended in the following ways. Replication with alternative 
assumptions about the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction would be 
welcome. Alternative social welfare functions should be investigated. Our static framework 
should be replaced with a dynamic one. Other proposals for targets and burden-sharing should 
be evaluated. All this is deferred to future research. 
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Table 1. Parameter levels used for analysis (calibrated with the FUND model: prtp=1%/yr) 
 
Acronym Name αi αi (globally 
uniform 
marginal 
cost) 
βi 
USA USA 412.8 -- 3.6 
CAN Canada 434.8 -- 0.2 
WEU Western Europe 1092.0 -- 5.7 
JPK Japan and South Korea 1056.7 -- -0.6 
ANZ Australia and New 
Zealand 
362.1 -- 0.1 
EEU Central and Eastern 
Europe 
99.7 -- 0.2 
FSU Former Soviet Union 26.1 -- 2.2 
MDE Middle East 66.7 -- 0.5 
CAM  Central America 229.9 -- 0.3 
LAM South America 740.8 -- 0.4 
SAS South Asia 80.9 -- 1.0 
SEA Southeast Asia 221.0 -- 1.5 
CHI China plus 142.9 -- 14.6 
NAF North Africa 127.8 -- 1.4 
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa  232.4 -- 1.3 
SIS Small Island States 65.2 -- 0.2 
     
World World -- 112.1 32.4 
(sum of the 
above) 
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Table 2. Descriptions of policy examples 
 
Acronym Name Kyoto, reduction 
relative to 
1990 % 
(A) Kyoto, 
net reduction 
from 
baseline %1 
(B) EU post-
Kyoto 
proposal,2 
reduction from 
baseline % 
(C) Frankel,3 
reduction from 
baseline % at 
2020 
USA USA 7 34 53 14 
CAN Canada 6 32 51 9 
WEU Western Europe 8 12 39 12 
JPK Japan and South 
Korea 
6 (Japan only) 28 57 17 
ANZ Australia and 
New Zealand 
8% increase 
(Australia) 
 0  
(New Zealand) 
31 59 7 
EEU Central and 
Eastern Europe 
8/6/5 (different 
by country) 
29 43 -- 
FSU Former Soviet 
Union 
0 5 15 -- 
MDE Middle East -- -- 15 -- 
CAM  Central 
America 
-- -- 15 -- 
LAM South America -- -- 15 -- 
SAS South Asia -- -- 15 -- 
SEA Southeast Asia -- -- 15 -- 
CHI China plus -- -- 15 -- 
NAF North Africa -- -- 15 -- 
SSA Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
-- -- -- -- 
SIS Small Island 
States 
-- -- 15 -- 
 
1. Baseline emissions estimated by FUND  
2. Lower bound for reduction by developing countries. The EU proposal states the poorest nations should be 
exempt from emission reduction. Here, only Sub-Saharan Africa is considered the poorest. 
3. After Frankel (2009). The formula is  log(reduction target) = log (emission target EU2008/BAU EU2008)  
     - 0.14*log(regional income per capitat-1/EU income per capita2007) 
    Emissions and income data are taken from FUND. We assume that the policy decision is made at the year 
2010 (i.e., t-1=2010).
Table 3. Estimated welfare weights (normalized as WEU=1; prtp=1% per year) 
Name (A) Kyoto (B) EU post-Kyoto proposal 
  Marginal 
welfare 
(ωi/yiη), 
ωi with 
η=0 
ωi with 
η=1 
ωi with 
η=2 
ωi with 
η=1 and 
uniform 
marginal 
abatement 
cost 
Marginal 
welfare 
(ωi/yiη), 
ωi with 
η=0 
ωi with 
η=1 
ωi with 
η=2 
ωi with 
η=1 and 
uniform 
marginal 
abatement 
cost 
E(ωi)) SD(ωi) η  
if ωi=ω  
USA 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.4 1.7 2.0 2.3 0.8 2.1 0.1 -4.1 
Canada 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.6 1.3 0.1 2.5 
Western Europe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -- -- 
Japan and South 
Korea 
0.4 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.4 0.9 1.1 0.1 1.2 
Australia and New 
Zealand 
1.1 0.7 0.5 0.2 1.7 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.1 1.3 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
4.2 0.5 0.05 0.04 9.6 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2 1.1 
Former Soviet Union 63.2 4.7 0.4 0.3 86 7.7 0.7 0.2 2.6 1.3 1.8 
Middle East --1 --1 --1 --1 47 3.8 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.6 1.5 
Central America --1 --1 --1 --1 14 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 1.1 
South America --1 --1 --1 --1 4.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.7 
South Asia --1 --1 --1 --1 37 0.8 0.02 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.9 
Southeast Asia --1 --1 --1 --1 14 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 1.0 
China plus --1 --1 --1 --1 15 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.3 1.2 
North Africa --1 --1 --1 --1 24 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  --1 --1 --1 --1 --1 --1 --1 --1 --1 --1 --1 
Small Island States --1 --1 --1 --1 50 2.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 1.2 
                       
1. No emission reduction requirements, implying the equity weight is positive infinity 
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Table 3 (continued)  
Acronym Name (C) Frankel 
    Marginal 
welfare 
(ωi/yiη), 
ωi with 
η=0 
ωi with 
η=1 
ωi with 
η=2 
ωi with 
η=1 and 
uniform 
marginal 
abatement 
cost 
USA USA 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
CAN Canada 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
WEU Western Europe 1 1 1 1 
JPK Japan and South 
Korea 
0.03 0.05 0.1 0.5 
ANZ Australia and 
New Zealand 
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 
EEU Central and 
Eastern Europe 
--1 --1 --1 --1 
FSU Former Soviet 
Union 
--1 --1 --1 --1 
MDE Middle East --1 --1 --1 --1 
CAM  Central America --1 --1 --1 --1 
LAM South America --1 --1 --1 --1 
SAS South Asia --1 --1 --1 --1 
SEA Southeast Asia --1 --1 --1 --1 
CHI China plus --1 --1 --1 --1 
NAF North Africa --1 --1 --1 --1 
SSA Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
--1 --1 --1 --1 
SIS Small Island 
States 
--1 --1 --1 --1 
 
 Figure 1. Relationship between the welfare weight (ωi) and the elasticity of marginal utility 
(inequity aversion: η) for selected regions in the EU post-Kyoto proposal case (Case B). 
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 Figure 2. Probability distributions of welfare weights (with η according to Evans and Sezer) for 
selected regions in the EU post-Kyoto proposal case (Case B). 
 
(a) USA 
 
 
 
(b) China (CHI) 
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(c) South Asia (SAS) 
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 Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis of welfare weights (η=1) for the EU post-Kyoto proposal case 
(Case B). 
 
 
 
 
* SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa)d does not have emission targets (in this sense, the weights are positive infinity).  
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Appendix. Regional categories used for analysis 
 
 
Acronym Name Countries 
USA USA United States of America 
CAN Canada Canada 
WEU Western Europe Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
JPK Japan and South 
Korea 
Japan, South Korea 
ANZ Australia and New 
Zealand 
Australia, New Zealand 
EEU Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, FYR 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia 
FSU Former Soviet 
Union 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
MDE Middle East Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen 
CAM  Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama 
SAM South America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
SAS South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
SEA Southeast Asia Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam 
CHI China plus China, Hong Kong, North Korea, Macau, Mongolia 
NAF North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Western Sahara 
SSA Sub-Saharan 
Africa  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
SIS Small Island States Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Fiji, French Polynesia, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritius, Micronesia, Nauru, 
Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Palau, Puerto Rico, Reunion, Samoa, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and 
Grenadines, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Virgin Islands 
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Year Number 
Title/Author(s) 
ESRI Authors/Co-authors Italicised 
   
2009   
   
   
 331 A Hedonic Analysis of the Value of Parks and  
Green Spaces in the Dublin Area 
  Karen Mayor, Seán Lyons, David Duffy and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 330 Measuring International Technology Spillovers and Progress 
Towards the European Research Area 
  Iulia Siedschlag  
   
 329 Climate Policy and Corporate Behaviour 
  Nicola Commins, Seán Lyons, Marc Schiffbauer, and Richard S.J. 
Tol 
   
 328 The Association Between Income Inequality and Mental Health: 
Social Cohesion or Social Infrastructure 
  Richard Layte and Bertrand Maître 
   
 327 A Computational Theory of Exchange: 
Willingness to pay, willingness to accept  
and the endowment effect 
  Pete Lunn  and Mary Lunn 
   
 326 Fiscal Policy for Recovery 
  John Fitz Gerald 
   
 325 The EU 20/20/2020 Targets: An Overview of the EMF22 
Assessment 
  Christoph Böhringer, Thomas F. Rutherford, and Richard S.J. 
Tol 
   
 324 Counting Only the Hits? The Risk of Underestimating the Costs 
of Stringent Climate Policy 
  Massimo Tavoni, Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 323 International Cooperation on Climate Change Adaptation from 
an Economic Perspective 
  Kelly C. de Bruin, Rob B. Dellink and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 322 What Role for Property Taxes in Ireland? 
  T. Callan, C. Keane and J.R. Walsh 
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 321 The Public-Private Sector Pay Gap in Ireland: What Lies 
Beneath? 
  Elish Kelly, Seamus McGuinness, Philip O’Connell 
   
 320 A Code of Practice for Grocery Goods Undertakings and An 
Ombudsman: How to Do a Lot of Harm by Trying to Do a Little 
Good 
  Paul K Gorecki 
   
 319 Negative Equity in the Irish Housing Market 
  David Duffy 
   
 318 Estimating the Impact of Immigration on Wages in Ireland 
  Alan Barrett, Adele Bergin and Elish Kelly 
   
 317 Assessing the Impact of Wage Bargaining and Worker 
Preferences on the Gender Pay Gap in Ireland Using the 
National Employment Survey 2003 
  Seamus McGuinness, Elish Kelly, Philip O’Connell, Tim Callan 
   
 316 Mismatch in the Graduate Labour Market Among Immigrants 
and Second-Generation Ethnic Minority Groups 
  Delma Byrne and Seamus McGuinness 
   
 315 Managing Housing Bubbles in Regional Economies under  
EMU: Ireland and Spain  
  Thomas Conefrey and John Fitz Gerald 
   
 314 Job Mismatches and Labour Market Outcomes 
  Kostas Mavromaras, Seamus McGuinness, Nigel O’Leary, Peter 
Sloane and Yin King Fok 
   
 313 Immigrants and Employer-provided Training 
  Alan Barrett, Séamus McGuinness, Martin O’Brien 
and Philip O’Connell 
   
 312 Did the Celtic Tiger Decrease Socio-Economic Differentials in 
Perinatal Mortality in Ireland? 
  Richard Layte and Barbara Clyne 
   
 311 Exploring International Differences in Rates of Return to 
Education: Evidence from EU SILC 
  Maria A. Davia, Seamus McGuinness and Philip, J. O’Connell 
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 310 Car Ownership and Mode of Transport to Work in Ireland 
  Nicola Commins and Anne Nolan 
   
 309 Recent Trends in the Caesarean Section Rate in Ireland 1999-
2006 
  Aoife Brick and Richard Layte 
   
 308 Price Inflation and Income Distribution 
  Anne Jennings, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 307 Overskilling Dynamics and Education Pathways 
  Kostas Mavromaras, Seamus McGuinness, Yin King Fok 
   
 306 What Determines the Attractiveness of the European Union to 
the Location of R&D Multinational Firms? 
  Iulia Siedschlag, Donal Smith, Camelia Turcu, Xiaoheng Zhang 
   
 305 Do Foreign Mergers and Acquisitions Boost Firm Productivity? 
  Marc Schiffbauer,  Iulia Siedschlag,  Frances Ruane 
   
 304 Inclusion or Diversion in Higher Education in the Republic of 
Ireland? 
  Delma Byrne 
   
 303 Welfare Regime and Social Class Variation in Poverty and 
Economic Vulnerability in Europe: An Analysis of EU-SILC 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 302 Understanding the Socio-Economic Distribution and 
Consequences of Patterns of Multiple Deprivation:  
An Application of Self-Organising Maps 
  Christopher T. Whelan, Mario Lucchini, Maurizio Pisati and 
Bertrand Maître 
   
 301 Estimating the Impact of Metro North  
  Edgar Morgenroth 
   
 300 Explaining Structural Change in Cardiovascular Mortality in 
Ireland 1995-2005: A Time Series Analysis  
  Richard Layte, Sinead O’Hara and Kathleen Bennett 
   
 299 EU Climate Change Policy 2013-2020: Using the Clean 
Development Mechanism More Effectively 
  Paul K Gorecki, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
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 298 Irish Public Capital Spending in a Recession 
  Edgar Morgenroth 
   
 297 Exporting and Ownership Contributions to Irish Manufacturing 
Productivity Growth 
  Anne Marie Gleeson, Frances Ruane 
   
 296 Eligibility for Free Primary Care and Avoidable Hospitalisations in 
Ireland 
  Anne Nolan 
   
 295 Managing Household Waste in Ireland:  
Behavioural Parameters and Policy Options 
  John Curtis, Seán Lyons and Abigail O’Callaghan-Platt 
   
 294 Labour Market Mismatch Among UK Graduates;  
An Analysis Using REFLEX Data 
  Seamus McGuinness and Peter J. Sloane 
   
 293 Towards Regional Environmental Accounts for Ireland 
  Richard S.J. Tol , Nicola Commins, Niamh Crilly, Sean Lyons and 
Edgar Morgenroth 
   
 292 EU Climate Change Policy 2013-2020: Thoughts on Property 
Rights and Market Choices 
  Paul K. Gorecki, Sean Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 291 Measuring House Price Change 
  David Duffy 
   
 290 Intra-and Extra-Union Flexibility in Meeting the European 
Union’s Emission Reduction Targets 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 289 The Determinants and Effects of Training at Work:  
Bringing the Workplace Back In 
  Philip J. O’Connell and Delma Byrne 
   
 288 Climate Feedbacks on the Terrestrial Biosphere and the 
Economics of Climate Policy: An Application of FUND 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 287 The Behaviour of the Irish Economy: Insights from the HERMES 
macro-economic model 
  Adele Bergin, Thomas Conefrey, John FitzGerald and  
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Ide Kearney  
   
 286 Mapping Patterns of Multiple Deprivation Using 
Self-Organising Maps: An Application to EU-SILC Data for 
Ireland 
  Maurizio Pisati, Christopher T. Whelan, Mario Lucchini and 
Bertrand Maître 
   
 285 The Feasibility of Low Concentration Targets:  
An Application of FUND 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 284 Policy Options to Reduce Ireland’s GHG Emissions 
 
Instrument choice: the pros and cons of alternative policy 
instruments 
  Thomas Legge and Sue Scott 
   
 283 Accounting for Taste: An Examination of Socioeconomic 
Gradients in Attendance at Arts Events 
  Pete Lunn and Elish Kelly 
   
 282 The Economic Impact of Ocean Acidification on Coral Reefs 
  Luke M. Brander, Katrin Rehdanz, Richard S.J. Tol, and Pieter 
J.H. van Beukering 
   
 281 Assessing the impact of biodiversity on tourism flows:  
A model for tourist behaviour and its policy implications 
  Giulia Macagno, Maria Loureiro, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Richard 
S.J. Tol 
   
 280 Advertising to boost energy efficiency: the Power of One 
campaign and natural gas consumption 
  Seán Diffney, Seán Lyons and Laura Malaguzzi Valeri 
   
 279 International Transmission of Business Cycles Between Ireland 
and its Trading Partners 
  Jean Goggin and Iulia Siedschlag 
   
 278 Optimal Global Dynamic Carbon Taxation 
  David Anthoff 
   
 277 Energy Use and Appliance Ownership in Ireland 
  Eimear Leahy and Seán Lyons 
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 276 Discounting for Climate Change 
  David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol and Gary W. Yohe 
   
 275 Projecting the Future Numbers of Migrant Workers in the Health 
and Social Care Sectors in Ireland 
  Alan Barrett and Anna Rust 
   
 274 Economic Costs of Extratropical Storms under Climate Change: 
An application of FUND 
  Daiju Narita, Richard S.J. Tol, David Anthoff 
   
 273 The Macro-Economic Impact of Changing the Rate of 
Corporation Tax 
  Thomas Conefrey and John D. Fitz Gerald 
   
 272 The Games We Used to Play 
An Application of Survival Analysis to the Sporting Life-course 
  Pete Lunn  
2008   
   
 271 Exploring the Economic Geography of Ireland 
  Edgar Morgenroth 
   
 270 Benchmarking, Social Partnership and Higher Remuneration: 
Wage Settling Institutions and the Public-Private Sector Wage 
Gap in Ireland 
  Elish Kelly, Seamus McGuinness, Philip O’Connell 
   
 269 A Dynamic Analysis of Household Car Ownership in Ireland 
  Anne Nolan 
   
 268 The Determinants of Mode of Transport to Work in the Greater 
Dublin Area 
  Nicola Commins and Anne Nolan 
   
 267 Resonances from Economic Development for Current Economic 
Policymaking 
  Frances Ruane 
   
 266 The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm-Level 
Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland 
  Seamus McGuinness, Elish Kelly and Philip O’Connell 
   
 265 Poverty in Ireland in Comparative European Perspective 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
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 264 A Hedonic Analysis of the Value of Rail Transport in the Greater 
Dublin Area 
  Karen Mayor, Seán Lyons, David Duffy and Richard S.J. Tol
   
 263 Comparing Poverty Indicators in an Enlarged EU 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître  
   
 262 Fuel Poverty in Ireland: Extent,  
Affected Groups and Policy Issues 
  Sue Scott, Seán Lyons, Claire Keane, Donal McCarthy and 
Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 261 The Misperception of Inflation by Irish Consumers 
  David Duffy and Pete Lunn 
   
 260 The Direct Impact of Climate Change on Regional Labour 
Productivity 
  Tord Kjellstrom, R Sari Kovats, Simon J. Lloyd, Tom Holt, 
Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 259 Damage Costs of Climate Change through Intensification of 
Tropical Cyclone Activities:  
An Application of FUND 
  Daiju Narita, Richard S. J. Tol and David Anthoff 
   
 258 Are Over-educated People Insiders or Outsiders?  
A Case of Job Search Methods and Over-education in UK 
  Aleksander Kucel, Delma Byrne 
   
 257 Metrics for Aggregating the Climate Effect of Different 
Emissions: A Unifying Framework 
  Richard S.J. Tol, Terje K. Berntsen, Brian C. O’Neill, Jan S. 
Fuglestvedt, Keith P. Shine, Yves Balkanski and Laszlo Makra 
   
 256 Intra-Union Flexibility of Non-ETS Emission Reduction 
Obligations in the European Union  
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 255 The Economic Impact of Climate Change 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 254 Measuring International Inequity Aversion 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
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 253 Using a Census to Assess the Reliability of a National Household 
Survey for Migration Research: The Case of Ireland 
  Alan Barrett and Elish Kelly 
   
 252 Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost of Carbon  
  David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol and Gary W. Yohe 
   
 251 The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Economic Growth and Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions in Ireland 
  Thomas Conefrey, John D. Fitz Gerald, Laura Malaguzzi Valeri 
and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 250 The Distributional Implications of a Carbon Tax in Ireland 
  Tim Callan, Sean Lyons, Susan Scott, Richard S.J. Tol and 
Stefano Verde 
   
 249 Measuring Material Deprivation in the Enlarged EU 
  Christopher T. Whelan, Brian Nolan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 248 Marginal Abatement Costs on Carbon-Dioxide Emissions: A 
Meta-Analysis 
  Onno Kuik, Luke Brander and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 247 Incorporating GHG Emission Costs in the Economic Appraisal of 
Projects Supported by State Development Agencies 
  Richard S.J. Tol and Seán Lyons 
   
 246 A Carton Tax for Ireland 
  Richard S.J. Tol, Tim Callan, Thomas Conefrey, John D. Fitz 
Gerald, Seán Lyons, Laura Malaguzzi Valeri and Susan Scott 
 245 Non-cash Benefits and the Distribution  of Economic Welfare 
  Tim Callan and Claire Keane 
   
 244 Scenarios of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Aviation 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 243 The Effect of the Euro on Export Patterns: Empirical Evidence 
from Industry Data 
  Gavin Murphy and Iulia Siedschlag  
   
 242 The Economic Returns to Field of Study and Competencies 
Among Higher Education Graduates in Ireland 
  Elish Kelly, Philip O’Connell and Emer Smyth 
   
 241 European Climate Policy and Aviation Emissions 
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  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 240 Aviation and the Environment in the Context of the EU-US Open 
Skies Agreement 
  Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 239 Yuppie Kvetch? Work-life Conflict and Social Class in Western 
Europe 
  Frances McGinnity and Emma Calvert 
   
 238 Immigrants and Welfare Programmes: Exploring the 
Interactions between Immigrant Characteristics, Immigrant 
Welfare Dependence and Welfare Policy 
  Alan Barrett and Yvonne McCarthy 
   
 237 How Local is Hospital Treatment? An Exploratory Analysis of 
Public/Private Variation in Location of Treatment in Irish Acute 
Public Hospitals  
  Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 236 The Immigrant Earnings Disadvantage Across the Earnings and 
Skills Distributions: The Case of Immigrants from the EU’s New 
Member States in Ireland 
  Alan Barrett, Seamus McGuinness and Martin O’Brien 
   
 235 Europeanisation of Inequality and European Reference Groups 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 234 Managing Capital Flows: Experiences from Central and Eastern 
Europe 
  Jürgen von Hagen and Iulia Siedschlag 
   
 233 ICT Diffusion, Innovation Systems, Globalisation and Regional 
Economic Dynamics: Theory and Empirical Evidence 
  Charlie Karlsson, Gunther Maier, Michaela Trippl, Iulia 
Siedschlag, Robert Owen and Gavin Murphy 
   
 232 Welfare and Competition Effects of Electricity Interconnection 
between Great Britain and Ireland 
  Laura Malaguzzi Valeri 
   
 231 Is FDI into China Crowding Out the FDI into the European 
Union? 
  Laura Resmini and Iulia Siedschlag 
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 230 Estimating the Economic Cost of Disability in Ireland 
  John Cullinan, Brenda Gannon and Seán Lyons 
   
 229 Controlling the Cost of Controlling the Climate: The Irish 
Government’s Climate Change Strategy 
  Colm McCarthy, Sue Scott 
   
 228 The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced-Growth-
Equivalent: An Application of FUND 
  David Anthoff, Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 227 Changing Returns to Education During a Boom? The Case of 
Ireland 
  Seamus McGuinness, Frances McGinnity, Philip O’Connell 
   
 226 ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Social Risks: Life Cycle and Social Class 
Perspectives on Social Exclusion in Ireland 
  Christopher T. Whelan and Bertrand Maître 
   
 225 The Climate Preferences of Irish Tourists by Purpose of Travel 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 224 A Hirsch Measure for the Quality of Research Supervision, and 
an Illustration with Trade Economists 
  Frances P. Ruane and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 223 Environmental Accounts for the Republic of Ireland: 1990-2005 
  Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
2007 222 Assessing Vulnerability of Selected Sectors under 
Environmental Tax Reform: The issue of pricing power 
  J. Fitz Gerald, M. Keeney and S. Scott 
   
 221 Climate Policy Versus Development Aid 
Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 220 Exports and Productivity – Comparable Evidence for 14 
Countries 
  The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity 
   
 219 Energy-Using Appliances and Energy-Saving Features: 
Determinants of Ownership in Ireland 
  Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
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 218 The Public/Private Mix in Irish Acute Public Hospitals: 
Trends and Implications 
Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam M. Wiley 
   
 217 Regret About the Timing of First Sexual Intercourse: The 
Role of Age and Context 
Richard Layte, Hannah McGee 
   
 216 Determinants of Water Connection Type and Ownership of 
Water-Using Appliances in Ireland 
Joe O’Doherty, Seán Lyons and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 215 Unemployment – Stage or Stigma? 
Being Unemployed During an Economic Boom 
Emer Smyth 
   
 214 The Value of Lost Load 
  Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 213 Adolescents’ Educational Attainment and School 
Experiences in Contemporary Ireland 
Merike Darmody, Selina McCoy, Emer Smyth 
   
 212 Acting Up or Opting Out? Truancy in Irish Secondary Schools 
Merike Darmody, Emer Smyth and Selina McCoy 
   
 211 Where do MNEs Expand Production: Location Choices of 
the Pharmaceutical Industry in Europe after 1992 
Frances P. Ruane, Xiaoheng Zhang 
   
 210 Holiday Destinations: Understanding the Travel Choices of 
Irish Tourists 
Seán Lyons, Karen Mayor and Richard S.J. Tol 
   
 209 The Effectiveness of Competition Policy and the Price-Cost 
Margin: Evidence from Panel Data 
Patrick McCloughan, Seán Lyons and William Batt 
   
 208 Tax Structure and Female Labour Market Participation: 
Evidence from Ireland 
Tim Callan, A. Van Soest, J.R. Walsh 
 
